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Edward R DoughertyAbstract
Hannah Arendt, one of the foremost political philosophers of the twentieth century, has argued that it is the
responsibility of educators not to leave children in their own world but instead to bring them into the adult world
so that, as adults, they can carry civilization forward to whatever challenges it will face by bringing to bear the
learning of the past. In the same collection of essays, she discusses the recognition by modern science that Nature
is inconceivable in terms of ordinary human conceptual categories - as she writes, ‘unthinkable in terms of pure
reason’. Together, these views on scientific education lead to an educational process that transforms children into
adults, with a scientific adult being one who has the ability to conceptualize scientific systems independent of
ordinary physical intuition. This article begins with Arendt’s basic educational and scientific points and develops
from them a critique of current scientific education in conjunction with an appeal to educate young scientists in
a manner that allows them to fulfill their potential ‘on the shoulders of giants’. While the article takes a general
philosophical perspective, its specifics tend to be directed at biomedical education, in particular, how such
education pertains to translational science.Review
Introduction
Between Past and Future is a collection of essays written
by Hannah Arendt between 1954 and 1968 in which,
among many other issues, she makes basic points re-
garding education and science that when taken together
entail a certain kind of scientific education [1]. From a
general perspective, education should provide students
with the knowledge to renew the world, that is, to re-
fresh and keep vibrant a civilization that, except for the
ability to take on new and unforeseen crises, would suc-
cumb to the vicissitudes of Nature and the human
condition.
In The Crisis in Education, Arendt writes,
Education is the point at which we decide whether we
love the world enough to assume responsibility for it
and by the same token save it from that ruin which,
except for renewal, except for the coming of the new
and young, would be inevitable. And education, too, is
where we decide whether we love our children
enough not to expel them from our world and leave
them to their own devices, nor to strike from theirCorrespondence: edward@ece.tamu.edu
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in any medium, provided the original work is phands their chance of undertaking something new,
something unforeseen by us, but to prepare them in
advance for the task of renewing a common world [2].
Sound education is not an option; society depends
upon it, for otherwise humans would lack the capacity
to renew their world since, in an endless cycle, the old
must pass on and leave it to the young to carry on. This
places a heavy responsibility upon educators. They must
not leave the young to fend for themselves; rather, they
must provide them with the fundamentals required to
maintain and extend human knowledge. These funda-
mentals apply not only to a specialized field of research;
they encompass a wide range of learning across many
fields, including science, mathematics, philosophy, and
history. Significant scientific knowledge does not rest on
particular technical relationships alone but rather on the
integration of myriad philosophical-scientific sources
that facilitate deep conceptualizations. Absent the ability
to conceptualize, one cannot engage in the creative
thought needed to discover new knowledge and address
the crises lurking in the future. To provide the young
with the fundamentals necessary for renewal, the educa-
tor must transform children into adults.open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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For aspiring young scientists, this transformation is gov-
erned by the nature of scientific knowledge. This leads us
to Arendt’s basic point regarding scientific knowledge. In
The Conquest of Space and the Stature of Man, she writes,
To understand physical reality seems to demand not
only the renunciation of an anthropocentric or
geocentric world view, but also a radical elimination of
all anthropomorphic elements and principles, as they
arise either from the world given to the five senses or
from the categories inherent in the human mind [3].
In a similar vein, in The Concept of History: Ancient
and Modern, she writes,
The trouble, in other words, is not that the modern
physical universe cannot be visualized, for this is a
matter of course under the assumption that Nature
does not reveal itself to the human senses; the
uneasiness begins when Nature turns out to be
inconceivable, that is, unthinkable in terms of pure
reasoning as well [4].
Not only need we reject an anthropocentric world
view, as one might do when accepting the Copernican
hypothesis, and not only need we accept the inability of
our senses to reveal Nature in her true form, but much
more than either of these limitations, we must accept
that Nature is so strange to us that it is not even think-
able in terms of the human categories of understanding.
It became quite clear in the first half of the twentieth
century, with the advent of the quantum theory and gen-
eral relativity, that ideas such as particle, wave, and
force, whose origins lay in pre-scientific perceptual ex-
perience, and frames of reference, such as Euclidean
three-dimensional space and linear time, and underlying
hypotheses concerning regularity, such as causality and
continuity, were inadequate, or even detrimental, to sci-
entific conceptualization. Erwin Schrodinger puts the
matter this way:
As our mental eye penetrates into smaller and smaller
distances and shorter and shorter times, we find
nature behaving so entirely differently from what
we observe in visible and palpable bodies of our
surrounding that no model shaped after our large-
scale experiences can ever be ‘true’. A completely
satisfactory model of this type is not only practically
inaccessible, but not even thinkable. Or, to be precise,
we can, of course, think it, but however we think it,
it is wrong; not perhaps quite as meaningless as a
‘triangular circle’, but much more so than a ‘winged
lion’ [5].Because science concerns relations between measur-
able variables and it is these relations that constitute the
subject matter of science, scientific knowledge ipso facto
is mathematically constituted. Nonetheless, scientists
had historically attached physical descriptions in the
sense of our ordinary categories of understanding to
their mathematical systems; however, once it is recog-
nized that the behavior of the phenomena is unthinkable
in terms of our ordinary pre-scientific categories, such
descriptions are no longer satisfactory. While they might
be useful in organizing one’s thinking, they are superflu-
ous; indeed, they can be misleading. In the words of
James Jeans, ‘The final truth about phenomena resides in
the mathematical description of it; so long as there is no
imperfection in this, our knowledge is complete. We go
beyond the mathematical formula at our own risk’ [6].
Scientific knowledge is not constrained by the limita-
tions of human physical understanding developed in our
everyday world of experience; indeed, everyday physical
thinking can be an impediment to scientific knowledge.
Lack of sensible experience applies not only to the
quantum world; it also applies to complexity. Humans
have no perceptual experience with systems, such as
cells, involving hundreds of thousands of interacting
components. The mind boggles and intuition crashes
when confronted with such immense complexity.
Whatever the reason might be for our inability to
think about Nature qua Nature, human knowledge of
Nature is not limited by our understanding of Nature.
Arendt writes, ‘What defies description in terms of the
“prejudices” of the human mind defies description in
every conceivable way of human language; it can no lon-
ger be described at all, and it is being expressed, but not
described, in mathematical processes’ [3]. The prejudices
to which she refers are, in the words of Niels Bohr, the
categories of ‘our necessarily prejudiced conceptual
frame’, [7] and include categories such as causality and
determinism. In sum, our scientific knowledge of Nature
is not given by description of the phenomena; rather, it
is constituted by mathematical processes.
As for the validity (or ‘truth’) of such processes, the
sole criterion is their functionality as predictors of future
behavior. This means that a scientific theory consists of
two parts: (1) the mathematical theory itself and (2) a
set of relations, called operational definitions, that con-
nects the theory to the phenomena so that the predictive
capacity of the theory can be tested. The operational def-
initions themselves are mathematical in form since the
accuracy of prediction must be understood within the
framework of statistics. Without going into detail on the
statistical issues involved, the key point in the present
exposition is that the mathematical theory must be for-
mally connected to future observations and the firmness
of this connection determines the truth of the theory.
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lief in causality, play no role in the acceptance or rejec-
tion of a theory. Richard Feynman writes, ‘It is whether
or not the theory gives predictions that agree with ex-
periment. It is not a question of whether a theory is
philosophically delightful, or easy to understand, or
perfectly reasonable from the point of view of common
sense’ [8]. The latter point is crucial. As stated by
Arendt, Nature is ‘unthinkable in terms of pure reason-
ing’, so reasoned arguments can play no role in validat-
ing a scientific theory.
The most remarkable aspect of modern science is that
when confronted with the inability to understand Na-
ture, human beings do not stand helpless before Nature.
Modern science has turned away from the ancient and
medieval attempts to describe Nature to building math-
ematical systems that can predict phenomena. Arendt
writes, ‘Man can do, and successfully do, what he cannot
comprehend and cannot express in everyday human lan-
guage’ [3]. That is, although the theory cannot be put
into words, given the operational definitions, it can be
tested. Mathematical reasoning allows us to go beyond
our physical reasoning in characterizing phenomenal re-
lations. Historian Morris Kline writes, ‘What science has
done, then, is to sacrifice physical intelligibility for the
sake of mathematical description and mathematical pre-
diction’ [9]. Notice that Kline refers to ‘mathematical de-
scription’, not description in terms of the ‘prejudices’ of
the human mind. Intelligibility resides in these ‘preju-
dices’, and therefore, we should not expect scientific the-
ories to be intelligible. This is why Feynman says, ‘I hope
you can accept Nature as she is — absurd’ [8]. Indeed,
Nature is ipso facto absurd because it is unintelligible.
While it may be true that our inability to think about
Nature in terms of our ordinary categories of physical
understanding has been brought into clear focus on ac-
count of general relativity and the quantum theory, as
Arendt points out, the issue has been with us since the
dawn of modern science in the seventeenth century. In
Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences, Galileo puts
these words into the mouth of Salviati:
The present does not seem to me to be an
opportune time to enter into the investigation of
the cause of the acceleration of natural motion…
For the present, it suffices our Author that we
understand him to want us to investigate and
demonstrate some attributes of a motion so
accelerated (whatever be the cause of its
acceleration) that the momenta of its speed go
increasing, after its departure from rest, in that
simple ratio with which the continuation of time
increases, which is the same as to say that in equal
times, equal additions of speed are made [10].Galileo does not deny causality; he simply brackets it
(puts it aside), ignores it, and gets on with the business
of obtaining mathematical relations between phenom-
ena. He writes that there would be ‘little gain’ in examin-
ing the kind of ‘fantasies’ put forth by philosophers to
explain acceleration in terms of causality. It is more
beneficial to ‘investigate and demonstrate some attri-
butes of motion’. Although Galileo does not deny
causality, as opposed to Aristotle, he rejects it as a re-
quirement for knowledge.
Like Galileo, Newton believes in causality but brackets
it outside of science. Near the beginning of The Princi-
pia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, he
writes, ‘For I here design only to give a mathematical no-
tion of these forces, without considering their physical
causes and seats’ [11]. Near the end of The Principia, he
states, ‘Hitherto I have not been able to discover the
cause of those properties of gravity from the phenom-
ena, and I frame no hypothesis; for whatever is not
deduced from the phenomena is to be called an hypoth-
esis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical,
whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place
in experimental philosophy’ [11].
Ancient and medieval science comes to an end with
Galileo and Newton, who are thoroughly modern in rec-
ognizing that human language and the concepts con-
structed within that language are not sufficient for
science. Kline writes, ‘The insurgent seventeenth century
found a qualitative world whose study was aided by
mathematical abstractions. It bequeathed a mathemat-
ical, quantitative world that subsumed under its math-
ematical laws the concreteness of the physical world’ [9].
It would be David Hume who would fully comprehend
that causality cannot be logically or empirically deduced
from natural phenomena and therefore is not a scientific
category. He notes that a cause and its effect are con-
tiguous and related via temporal priority, with the cause
prior to the effect. But causality corresponds to more
than contiguity and temporal priority; it relates to a ‘ne-
cessary connection’ between the cause and the effect.
However, the principle of causality is neither intuitively
certain nor provable by logical means, and according to
Hume, our belief in the principle rests not on reason,
but on habit and custom.
Immanuel Kant agrees with Hume that the principle
of causality is not a scientific principle; however, whereas
for Hume, habit underlies belief in causality, for Kant,
causality is a category of understanding that imposes
forms on the data of sensation, and scientific knowledge
is limited by these forms. The way things appear, such as
being spatially coordinated and connected by causality,
is due to subjective a priori conditions for human know-
ledge. One cannot know things apart from the manner
in which they conform to these a priori mental forms.
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ity, regarding Nature, the basic point remains. Kant
writes, ‘[Hume] justly maintains that we cannot compre-
hend by reason the possibility of causality, that is, of the
reference of the existence of one thing to the existence
of another, which is necessitated by the former’ [12].
Rather, causality is automatically imposed upon the phe-
nomena to make them thinkable.
Even if this is so, why should they be thinkable? Jeans
states the matter concisely: ‘We need no longer discuss
whether light consists of particles or waves; we know all
there is to be known about it if we have found a math-
ematical formula which accurately describes its behavior,
and we can think of it as either particles or waves ac-
cording to our mood and the convenience of the mo-
ment’ [6]. One can think about the phenomena in terms
of ordinary physical categories of understanding, but the
choice of how one chooses to think about them depends
on one’s predilections of the moment. The danger is that
the intuitions associated with the phenomena might
have nothing to do with them - or worse, be completely
misleading.
Educational implications
Two major educational implications arise from the in-
conceivability of Nature. One is technical and relates to
the ability to conceptualize and hence form scientific
theories. The other is more general and has to do with
appreciating and working within an epistemology that
presupposes conceptualizations outside those of the or-
dinary understanding and outside of ordinary language.
Technical implications
Broad mathematical knowledge gives a scientist greater
capability for conceptualization. Thus, it is obvious that
budding scientists should be armed with a large math-
ematical tool box rich in the mathematics appropriate to
one’s field - the deeper the mathematical knowledge, the
more suitable for framing fundamental scientific know-
ledge. For instance, since the characterization of cellular
behavior involves massive stochastic systems of interact-
ing genes and proteins, to constitute biological know-
ledge at more than a superficial level, a biologist must be
armed with a working knowledge of stochastic processes.
How else would it be possible to conceptualize the
processes that will inevitably constitute the theory char-
acterizing signaling pathways within the cell? This does
not simply mean that a biologist needs to possess
a mathematical understanding of existing stochastic
models for cellular behavior; more to the point, being a
biologist means to formulate scientific theories, not sim-
ply to read about the theories of others. The biologist
must also formulate experiments that elicit relevant
behavior of cellular pathways and use the resultingobservations to formulate network models. The need for
a rich tool box is not an esoteric requirement for a small
group of theoretical academicians; it applies directly to
those studying regulatory diseases such as cancer.
None of this is new. In 1948, Norbert Wiener wrote,
‘The group of scientists about Dr. Rosenblueth and my-
self had already become aware of the essential unity of
the set of problems centering about communication,
control, and statistical mechanics, whether in the ma-
chine or in living tissue’ [13]. By 1948, Wiener had
recognized the epistemological unity of systems-based
sciences, be they electrical, economic, or biological sys-
tems. The fact that biology concerns systems was noted
in 1935 by Conrad Waddington, who wrote, ‘To say that
an animal is an organism means in fact two things:
firstly, that it is a system made up of separate parts, and
secondly, that in order to describe fully how any one
part works one has to refer either to the whole system
or to the other parts’ [14].
Today, given the vast body of relevant knowledge ac-
cumulated since the 1930s, would it not behoove our
educational system to educate biologists so that they
possess a working knowledge of stochastic systems?
What could possibly be the point of not educating biolo-
gists so that they have the knowledge to address bio-
logical problems at a deep level? Why send out young
researchers to try to engineer solutions to cancer with-
out first educating them in the well-established theory of
stochastic control? As M. L. Bittner and I have written
elsewhere, ‘Isaac Newton published his Principia in 1646;
Pierre-Simon Laplace published the first volume of his
Celestial Mechanics 150 years later in 1796. Laplace's
system depends on the calculus of Newton and its sub-
sequent developments over a century and a half. Laplace
did not ignore the well-developed mathematics of his
day and try to develop his mechanics without it; rather,
he used the relevant available tools’ [15]. Is there any ra-
tionale for sending young scientists out into the research
world with the vain hope that elementary mathematics
will suffice for the investigation of complex regulatory
networks? We return to Arendt’s first point: Do ‘we love
our children enough not to…leave them to their own
devices?’
This is not to argue that biologists or physicists need
to be mathematicians. Albert Einstein was not a math-
ematician and had the assistance of a number of out-
standing and great mathematicians, including David
Hilbert. What Einstein had, however, was sufficient
mathematical knowledge to give him the power of
conceptualization. He writes, ‘Experience, of course, re-
mains the sole criterion for the serviceability of mathem-
atical constructions for physics, but the truly creative
principle resides in mathematics’ [16]. The creative
principle must lie in mathematics because scientific
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need not be a mathematician, there is a threshold that
must be crossed. Wiener clarifies the issue very well:
‘The mathematician need not have the skill to conduct a
physiological experiment, but he must have the skill to
understand one, to criticize one, and to suggest one. The
physiologist need not be able to prove a certain mathem-
atical theorem, but he must be able to grasp its physio-
logical significance and tell the mathematician for what
he should look for’ [13].
Referring to my 2012 book with M. L. Bittner, Epis-
temology of the Cell [17], Terrence McGarty writes, ‘The
authors place a stake in the ground to say what would
be expected for those to work in the field, that the books
by Loeve and Cramer be used as standard bearers!…
Thus they set a high hurdle, but a necessary one for
those to work in the field’ [18]. Two points can be made
regarding McGarty’s comment. First, Michel Loeve pub-
lished his Probability Theory in 1955 and Harald Cramer
published his Mathematical Methods in Statistics in
1946. Surely more than half a century later, statisticians
involved in scientific research should at least be at the
level of these seminal books; however, perusal of the bio-
informatics literature provides convincing evidence that
a large number of recent Ph.D.s lack proficiency in the
basics of their subject. The second point regarding
McGarty’s comment is that these books set a ‘necessary’
standard for medical research based on cell dynamics.
Given that this standard is not being met, can we expect
any more from the billions of dollars poured into bio-
medical research than the meager, and often meaningless
or even erroneous, results now being published [19-24]?
The situation is far worse than statisticians not know-
ing fundamental theory. There is growing evidence that
statisticians in major research groups apparently cannot
even properly utilize rudimentary statistics. John Ioanni-
dis writes, ‘There is increasing concern that in modern
research, false findings may be the majority or even the
vast majority of published research claims…. Simulations
show that for most study designs and settings, it is more
likely for a research claim to be false than true’ [19].
Mehta et al. write, ‘Many papers aimed at the high di-
mensional biology community describe the development
or application of statistical techniques. The validity of
many of these is questionable, and a shared understand-
ing about the epistemological foundations of the statis-
tical methods themselves seems to be lacking’ [22].
Alain Dupuy and Richard Simon, Chief of the Biometric
Research Branch, Division of Cancer Treatment and
Diagnosis, of the National Cancer Institute, state, ‘Both
the validity and the reproducibility of microarray-based
clinical research have been challenged’ [23]. Based on a
detailed analysis of 42 studies published in 2004, Dupuy
and Simon report that 21 (50%) of them contain at leastone of three basic flaws. The situation is actually much
worse because, as will shortly be discussed, many use
error estimation methods, that while properly computed,
are not applicable under the experimental conditions in
which they are being employed (Dupuy and Simon only
consider an error estimate to be flawed if it is calculated
incorrectly). Needless to say, the vast majority of errone-
ous research findings are favorable to the authors’ claims.
This phenomenon has been politely termed ‘over-opti-
mism’ [24]. Anne-Laure Boulesteix writes, ‘The difficulty
to publish negative results obviously encourages authors
to find something positive in their study by performing
numerous analyses until one of them yields positive results
by chance, i.e. to fish for significance’ [24].
Lest one think that Ioannidis and Boulesteix, and
others, are being overly pessimistic, according to a re-
cent report regarding comments by Janet Woodcock,
Director of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
at the FDA, she has estimated that as much as 75% of
published biomarker associations are not replicable. She
states, ‘This poses a huge challenge for industry in bio-
marker identification and diagnostics development’ [25].
Much of the blame for these non-reproducible findings
rests with a cavalier attitude towards the application of
statistical methods [26].
There are various ways to fish for significance, but the
sport often revolves around bogus error estimation: use
an error estimation procedure with large variance so that
when the analysis is repeated with different data analysis
methods, it is highly probable that a good-looking (but
phony) result will occur and then report that result.
When trying to find sets of genes to classify a disease, two
popular fishing methods are to try a number of different
data sets [27] or try numerous methods to design the clas-
sifier [28]. In the first case, an error estimate is computed
for each data set, and in the second, an error estimate is
computed for each attempted classifier. Such fishing can
be hard to detect unless the authors' reveal how many data
sets and classification schemes they have tried.
One should not jump to the conclusion that fishing
represents a deliberate attempt to publish fraudulent re-
search; rather, the widespread use of error estimation
techniques such as cross-validation makes it much more
likely that it is simply a matter of inadequate education.
Given that these estimates can be used by a sixth grader
and appear in text books absent any proof that they
should provide accurate results, and given ample evi-
dence going back to 1978 showing that they should not
be expected to produce accurate results when samples
are small [29-34] as is very often the case in real-world
situations, one can reasonably conclude that society is
reaping the rewards of educational impoverishment.
One can hardly imagine a statistician brought up on
Cramer being so cavalier with statistical methods.
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Science has a rich and varied history. Its epistemological
ground has shifted from its totally empirical Egyptian-
Mesopotamian beginnings through its integration with
metaphysics with Aristotle to the beginnings of the
experimental-mathematical duality with Francis Bacon
and Galileo and onto complete freedom from concep-
tion within the ordinary categories of understanding in
the twentieth century. A deep appreciation of this his-
tory allows a scientist to see his work in the stream of
civilization and to avoid falling into the myriad of fruit-
less paths that have beguiled our predecessors.
For those who truly wish to be scientists, Einstein’s fol-
lowing words penned in a letter should be taken to heart:
I fully agree with you about the significance and
educational value of methodology as well as history
and philosophy of science. So many people today –
and even professional scientists – seem to me like
somebody who has seen thousands of trees but
has never seen a forest. A knowledge of the historic
and philosophical background gives that kind of
independence from prejudices of his generation
from which most scientists are suffering. This
independence created by philosophical insight is – in
my opinion – the mark of distinction between a mere
artisan or specialist and a real seeker after truth [35].
It is natural for Einstein to refer to the ‘prejudices of
his generation’. As a young man he had broken free
from the Newtonian world that had been regnant since
Newton’s Principia.
Three centuries before Einstein, Francis Bacon urged
mankind to break free from prejudices of two millennia
when in his Novum Organum, he called upon natural
philosophers to go beyond haphazard observation of
Nature to directed and purposeful observation:
There remains simple experience which, if taken as it
comes, is called accident; if sought for, experiment.
But this kind of experience is no better than a broom
without its band, as the saying is — a mere groping,
as of men in the dark, that feel all round them for the
chance of finding their way, when they had much
better wait for daylight, or light a candle, and then go.
But the true method of experience, on the contrary,
first lights the candle, and then by means of the
candle shows the way; commencing as it does with
experience duly ordered and digested, not bungling or
erratic, and from it educing axioms, and from
established axioms again new experiments [36].
Reflecting on the rapid advance of post-Galilean sci-
ence in comparison to the scanty achievements of thepreceding 2,000 years, in the preface of the second edi-
tion of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant writes,
Reason must approach nature with the view, indeed,
of receiving information from it, not, however, in the
character of a pupil, who listens to all that his master
chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who
compels the witnesses to reply to those questions
which he himself thinks fit to propose. To this single
idea must the revolution be ascribed, by which, after
groping in the dark for so many centuries, natural
science was at length conducted into the path of
certain progress [37].
As opposed to groping about amid unstructured ob-
servations, in accordance with his own mental con-
structs, the scientist imposes himself upon Nature by
setting up conditions that constrain Nature to behave in
ways that provide answers to targeted questions.
We hear the reverberation of Bacon and Kant in the
words of statistician Douglas Montgomery: ‘By the stat-
istical design of experiments we refer to the process of
planning the experiment so that appropriate data will be
collected, which may be analyzed by statistical methods
resulting in valid and objective conclusions. The statis-
tical approach to experimental design is necessary if we
wish to draw meaningful conclusions from the data’ [38].
Statistical experimental design is a key part of the evolu-
tion of scientific thinking over the last four centuries.
Moreover, the validity of scientific knowledge is character-
ized by the predictive capacity of a theory, and the predict-
ive capacity must be evaluated using proper statistical
theory. Groping and fishing are out of place here.
Contemporary efforts at groping and fishing go under
the name of ‘data mining’. Massive amounts of unstruc-
tured data are being collected via all sorts of expensive
technology without any experimental design. The data
set is said to be ‘big’ when it contains an enormous
number of measurements. A so-called big data set often
arises from measuring tens of thousands of variables
with only a small number of replicates. Hence, from a
statistical perspective, the data set is extremely small, be-
cause the number of replicates required to assure good
inference typically grows faster than the number of vari-
ables being measured. Therefore, 100 replicates for
10,000 variables is a scanty data set. Once this sup-
posedly big data set is obtained, it is ‘mined’ by various
groping algorithms, usually going under the name of
‘machine learning’ and generally trying to discover pat-
terns in the data. Clustering algorithms cluster data to
group together data points that are similar relative to
some criterion. Classification algorithms generate classi-
fiers that will then be used to classify future observa-
tions. Of course, clustering algorithms form clusters and
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clusters and classifiers possess any scientific content is
generally not seriously addressed. Some so-called ‘valid-
ation index’ may be computed for the clusters and some
error estimate might be computed for the classifier, but
these are rarely probabilistically justified. Clustering val-
idation indices generally lack any substantiating theory
and have been shown to often possess very little correl-
ation with clustering error [39]. Simulation studies have
shown small-sample error estimators to typically be in-
accurate [29-33]. Moreover, only recently has there been
any theoretical analysis of their accuracy [40-43], and
this has only scratched the surface. Hence, the scientific
literature is littered with thousands of null or erroneous
papers referring back and forth to each other in some
sort of nihilistic waltz.
This is not to say that data collected without experi-
mental design cannot lead to major discoveries. Perhaps
the most salient illustration in this regard is the helio-
centric theory. Nicolaus Copernicus used data collected
by Claudius Ptolemy about 1,400 years earlier to develop
his heliocentric theory, and Johannes Kepler used data
collected by Tycho Brahe, who by the way rejected the
heliocentric theory, to develop his laws of planetary
motion.
It is not that thinking about unplanned data cannot
bear fruit; rather, greater progress can typically be
achieved by having an idea and then obtaining data dir-
ectly in response to questions emanating from that idea.
Hans Reichenbach states the matter in terms relating to
complexity when he writes, ‘An experiment is a question
addressed to Nature…. As long as we depend on the ob-
servation of occurrences not involving our assistance,
the observable happenings are usually the product of so
many factors that we cannot determine the contribution
of each individual factor to the total result’ [44]. What is
the question? This is the question that a scientist must
address in his role as a scientist. The more precise the
question, the more likely he is to draw from Nature the
desired knowledge. According to Arturo Rosenblueth
and Norbert Wiener, ‘An experiment is a question. A
precise answer is seldom obtained if the question is not
precise; indeed, foolish answers – i.e., inconsistent, dis-
crepant or irrelevant experimental results – are usually
indicative of a foolish question’ [45]. Finally, let it be
noted that Arendt is in full agreement with these assess-
ments. In The Concept of History: Ancient and Modern,
she states, ‘The natural sciences turned toward the ex-
periment, which, by directly interfering with nature, as-
sured the development whose progress has ever since
appeared to be limitless’ [4].
Data mining and Copernicus share a lack of experi-
mental design; however, in contradistinction to data
mining, Copernicus thought about unplanned data andchanged the world, the key word being ‘thought.’
Copernicus was not an algorithm numerically crunch-
ing data until some stopping point, very often with
no adequate theory of convergence or accuracy.
Copernicus had a mind and ideas. William Barrett
writes, ‘The absence of an intelligent idea in the grasp
of a problem cannot be redeemed by the elaborate-
ness of the machinery one subsequently employs’
[46]. Or as M. L. Bittner and I have asked, ‘Does any-
one really believe that data mining could produce the
general theory of relativity’ [17]?
Data mining represents a regression from the achieve-
ments of three and a half centuries of epistemological
progress to a radical empiricism, in regard to which
Reichenbach writes, ‘A mere report of relations observed
in the past cannot be called knowledge. If knowledge is
to reveal objective relations of physical objects, it must
include reliable predictions. A radical empiricism, there-
fore, denies the possibility of knowledge’ [44]. A collection
of measurements together with statements about the mea-
surements is not scientific knowledge, unless those state-
ments are tied to verifiable predictions concerning the
phenomena to which the measurements pertain.
One only need read Siddhartha Mukherjee’s The
Emperor of All Maladies: A Biography of Cancer to be
shocked by the suffering inflicted on patients by a radical
empiricism. Concerning chemotherapy in the 1970s, he
writes,
The NCI meanwhile was turning into a factory of
toxins. The influx of money from the National Cancer
Act had potently stimulated the institute’s drug-
discovery program, which had grown into an even
more gargantuan effort and was testing hundreds of
thousands of chemicals each year to discover new
cytotoxic drugs. The strategy of discovery was
empirical – throwing chemicals at cancer cells in test
tubes to identify cancer killers – but, by now,
unabashedly and defiantly so…
Chemicals thus came pouring out of the NCI’s
cauldrons, each one with a unique personality.
There was Taxol, one gram purified from the bark
of a hundred Pacific yew trees…. Adriamycin,…even
at therapeutic doses, it could irreversibly damage
the heart. Etoposide came from the fruit of the
poisonous mayapple. Bleonmycin, which could
scare lungs without warning, was an antibiotic
derived from mold.
The greatly expanded coffers of the NCI also stimulated
enormous, expensive, multi-institutional trials, allowing
academic centers to trot out ever more powerful
permutations of cytotoxic drugs. Cancer hospitals, also
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efficient and thrumming trial-running machines….
It was trial and error on a giant human scale…. In
another particularly tenacious trial, known as the
eight-in-one study, children with brain tumors were
given eight drugs in a single day. Predictably, horrific
complications ensued. Fifteen percent of the patients
needed blood transfusions. Six percent were hospitalized
with life-threatening infections. Fourteen percent of the
children suffered kidney damage; three lost their hearing.
One patient died of septic shock…. Most of the children
in the eight-in-one trial died soon afterward, having
only marginally responded to chemotherapy.
This pattern was repeated with tiresome regularity for
many forms of cancer…. Like lunatic cartographers,
chemotherapists frantically drew and redrew their
strategies to annihilate cancer [47].
This, in the 1970s, after engineers had put men on the
moon! What profound ideas lay behind ‘throwing chemi-
cals at cancer cells in test tubes?’
While ignorance of basic scientific method is a serious
problem, it is necessary to probe further than simply meth-
odological ignorance to get at the full depth of the educa-
tional problem. Science does not stand alone, disjoint from
the rest of culture. Science takes place within the general
human intellectual condition. Biology cannot be divorced
from physics, nor can either be divorced from mathematics
and philosophy. One’s total intellectual repertoire affects
the direction of inquiry: the richer one’s knowledge, the
more questions that can be asked. Schrodinger comments,
‘A selection has been made on which the present structure
of science is built. That selection must have been influenced
by circumstances that are other than purely scientific’ [48].
If one is intellectually and culturally impoverished, then
one’s set of possible selections will be small. Fundamental
issues arise in the presence of deep conflicts or inadequa-
cies within scientific theory. Serious study of historical anti-
nomies and their resolutions enriches the mind, provides
it with the perspective to see new fundamental issues, and
trains it with the ability to think orthogonally to the at-
tacks that have heretofore been thrown against the prob-
lem without success.
Can one truly appreciate the present without know-
ledge of the great past ruptures in human thinking? The
Ptolemaic system assured man’s position at the center of
the universe until Copernicus put humans on a planet
revolving around the sun. From Euclid through Kant,
Euclidean geometry provided the framework for human
sensibility before this worldview was shattered by the
non-Euclidean geometry of Janos Bolyai and Nikolai
Lobachevsky. From Aristotle into the eighteenth century,philosophers and scientists accepted a causal world view,
even with its bracketing by Galileo and Newton, until
David Hume showed with relative ease that there was no
logical or empirical support for cause in Nature and
mankind was shaken from a comfortable causal, deter-
ministic outlook and tossed into probabilistic insecurity.
The Newtonian world of absolute space seemed all too
obvious until Einstein shattered the obvious. And from
Euclid into the twentieth century, man’s hope for some
safe harbor of consistency in his thinking was believed
to lie in mathematics until in 1931 Kurt Godel proved
that the consistency of any mathematical system rich
enough to include whole number arithmetic (which is
not much) cannot be proven by the ordinary basic prin-
ciples of logic. Each of these ruptures was a shock to
human understanding and the human position in the
universe. All that came before was overturned, and a
new human condition came into being. Study of these
events, along with the historical and other scientific
events surrounding them, forms the intellect. There have
been many more disruptive events, perhaps of lesser
cosmic import. Some of these pertain to one’s individual
scientific pursuits. These, too, need to be placed into his-
torical context so that a student understands what has
come before, what the situation is today, and the possi-
bilities of where it will go tomorrow.
Arendt emphasizes that the proper role of education is
to raise the child out of the world of children into the
adult world. Admittedly, this is a painful process. None-
theless, it is necessary if the child is to take his place in
the adult world and contribute to the maintenance and
furtherance of that world. Nothing is more disheartening
than to discuss causality and be forced to listen to
sophomoric arguments insisting on a causal science.
You ask the bright young scientist if he has read Hume’s
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding or Kant’s
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, and there is a
blank look. Something terribly important for a scientist
(or, for that matter, any supposedly educated person) is
missing. You are confronting an educational impoverish-
ment that precludes the possibility of a serious discus-
sion and has resulted in the person’s thinking processes
being centuries out of date.
Hume and Kant have transformed human reason, and
a student must drink that transformation to the dregs or
remain intellectually stunted. All that comes after,
including twentieth century science, statistics, and
engineering, would not be what it is without this trans-
formation. In a few short pages, Hume rocks the scien-
tific and philosophic worlds. Einstein comments, ‘If one
reads Hume’s books, one is amazed that many and
sometimes even highly esteemed philosophers after him
have been able to write so much obscure stuff and even
find grateful readers for it. Hume has permanently
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who came after him’ [49]. William Barrett calls Kant the
‘pivot’ [50]. Barrett provides a diagram in which pre-
Kantian rationalism and empiricism enter into Kant and
outcome idealism, positivism, pragmatism, and existen-
tialism into the post-Kantian world. There is much here
to chew on for the scientist, who is often torn between
rationalism and empiricism. After Kant, the phenomena,
which are somehow constructed in the mind from sense
data, are ever separated from the noumena, which are
the things-in-themselves (actual Nature). How one per-
ceives this separation tells much about one’s scientific
perspective. As Jose Ortega y Gasset says, ‘Einstein
needed to saturate himself with Kant and Mach before
he could reach his own keen synthesis. Kant and Mach –
the names are mere symbols of the enormous mass of
philosophic and psychological thought which has influ-
enced Einstein – have served to liberate the mind of the
latter and leave the way open for his innovation’ [51].
Building on the century and a half of philosophic and
scientific development beginning with Bacon, Hume
and Kant redefine adulthood. To intellectually become
an adult, one must walk the path they trod.
When one ponders the massively complex regulatory
machinery of the cell, its parallelism, non-linearity, feed-
back, redundancy, multiple time scales, and stochasticity,
it helps immensely to have struggled through Hume’s
dismantling of causality and Kant’s analysis of the cat-
egories of understanding. A scientific adult views this
complex regulatory network in the light of stochastic
systems theory, not through the eyes of a child who
thinks it possible to gain knowledge of system dynamics
by looking at some computer-generated visualization, as
if scientific knowledge were somehow akin to gazing at
colorful pictures. It is immensely beneficial to have suf-
fered the anguish of maturation in undergraduate school
and thereby freed the mind for the non-intuitive peculi-
arities of a stochastic world, a place in which one’s intu-
ition is constantly shocked. More than that, having
broken free of the ‘prejudices’ of the mind and having
recognized the mind’s inability to describe Nature in
terms of its ordinary physical categories, one learns that
story telling has no place in science and that one must
stick closely to rigorous mathematical and statistical
analysis.
Playing children’s games
Scientific epistemology has developed so as to formalize
quantitative predictive relations between phenomena
and to characterize the truth of those relations based
upon the efficacy of predictions regarding those phe-
nomena. Not only has this epistemology led to a
grounding of scientific knowledge that overcomes the
skepticism of Hume, it has also resulted in mankind’sability to alter the course of Nature in ways beneficial to
human existence.
Peering into a future ubiquitous with data mining and
the oxymoronic data science, troubling questions arise.
How many patients will be improperly treated based on
gene- or protein-based diagnostic tests developed using
statistically meaningless performance estimates? How
many billions of dollars will be wasted on studies so
poorly designed that they cannot possibly produce useful
results? How many petabytes of unstructured data will
be generated by academic centers to be groped through
in mindless darkness? It all sounds utterly childish to
those who have walked the epistemological path from
Aristotle to Galileo to Newton to Hume to Kant to
Einstein to Schrodinger. Oblivious to the demands of
science, the educationally impoverished proponents of
this latest incarnation of radical empiricism are playing
children’s games, except that these games will not pay
off in candy, but in human suffering on a grand scale -
even if it is only the result of the billions of wasted dol-
lars that could have been spent on serious research.
What has brought our civilization to this point? Again
we turn to Arendt: ‘In education this responsibility for
the world takes the form of authority…. Authority has
been discarded by the adults, and this can mean only
one thing: that the adults refuse to assume responsibility
for the world into which they have brought the children’
[2]. Irresponsibility has led to the impoverishment of
education and a consequent loss of scientific capability.
One might laugh at the ignorance that Mukherjee re-
peatedly highlights, but the suffering of innocent pa-
tients at the hands of those whose reasoning lies
somewhere in the fifteenth century is not a laughing
matter. More recently, the world witnessed a bizarre
fiasco in the Gulf of Mexico, where we were assured that
the ‘best’ engineers were on hand to stop an oil spill.
These ‘best’ engineers demonstrated their fifteenth century
capability by pouring rocks into a hole and surrounding
floating oil with poles dragged by ships, something that
Odysseus might have done. The ludicrousness of the
whole operation can easily be seen by comparing this woe-
ful episode with the engineering operations run by Robert
Oppenheimer and Werner von Braun.
The plight of science is not a scientific problem. It lies
outside of science, in a general collapse of authority.
Ortega y Gasset places the matter in the wider context:
Whoever wishes to have ideas must first prepare
himself to desire truth and to accept the rules of the
game imposed by it. It is no use speaking of ideas
when there is no acceptance of a higher authority to
regulate them, a series of standards to which it is
possible to appeal in a discussion. These standards are
the principles on which culture rests. I am not
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is that there is no culture where there are no
standards to which our fellow-men can have
recourse…. Barbarism is the absence of standards
to which appeal can be made [51].
The scientific epistemology posits standards developed
over centuries to ground knowledge with a functional,
phenomenal, and inter-subjective concept of truth. The
theory can be understood by anyone possessing the
requisite mathematical knowledge. The experimental
protocols can be understood by anyone possessing
knowledge of the experimental apparatus. The oper-
ational definitions, corresponding statistics, and valid-
ation criteria take logical or mathematical form and
again can be understood by anyone possessing the
requisite knowledge. The overall theory, mathematical
and experimental, is therefore inter-subjective. This is
not to say that two people cannot disagree on whether
to accept a theory. That will depend on their validation
criteria. One may impose stronger, or different, validation
criteria than the other. There is inter-subjectivity because
each understands the other’s criteria. This is not to say
that the truth of the theory is universally applicable. On
the contrary, it is constrained by the context in which the
relations (equations) of the theory are purported to hold.
Outside that context, the relations might fail, so that the
context in which the operational definitions can be applied
must be specified. All of this provides the standards by
which the higher authority is constituted. But that author-
ity must be manifested by human beings, and these must
be sufficiently educated so that they can make judgments
in accordance with that authority. If educators fail in their
responsibility to educate, then the higher authority be-
comes vacuous because in practice there will be no one,
or an insufficient number, to exercise it.
If educators fail to educate, then civilization, not just
science, is at grave risk. Will Durant, who spent his life
studying the rise and fall of civilizations, puts the matter
starkly: ‘For civilization is not something inborn or im-
perishable; it must be acquired anew by every gener-
ation, and any serious interruption in its financing or its
transmission may bring it to an end. Man differs from
the beast only by education, which may be defined as
the technique of transmitting civilization’ [52]. And what
is the relationship of science to civilization? Perhaps this
question can best be answered by noting that Will and
Ariel Durant list three books as ‘the basic events in the
history of modern Europe’: Philosophiae Naturalis
Principia Mathematica (Isaac Newton), De Revolutioni-
bus Orbium Coelestium (Nicolaus Copernicus), and The
Origin of the Species (Charles Darwin) [53]. For Will and
Ariel Durant, these books are not simply the basic
events of science; they are the fundamental events thathave driven the overall philosophic, religious, and political
evolution of Western Civilization - more profound than
Martin Luther nailing his 95 theses to the door of the
Castle Church in Wittenberg, than Renes Descartes’ sys-
tematic doubt, than Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the
French Revolution. To appreciate the monumental roles
of Copernicus, Newton, and Darwin, one must be able
to place and understand them in the historic stream of
philosophic thought. To bring students into the univer-
sity and leave them ignorant of Plato, Aristotle, Bacon,
Hume, Kant, et al. is to deny them a meaningful education.
It is to leave them outside the course of civilization and to
stunt their growth into intellectual adulthood. In Arendt’s
words, it is to ‘strike from their hands their chance of
undertaking something new, something unforeseen by us’.
And the horrific cost will be borne by future generations.
Once lost or seriously diminished, modern science will
not be easily resuscitated. It is a unique and precious gift
to our civilization, one whose continuance is not guaran-
teed: Ortega y Gasset recognizes its tenuous character
when he writes,
Has any thought been given to the number of things
that must remain active in men’s souls in order that
there may still continue to be ‘men of science’ in real
truth?… Experimental science is one of the most
unlikely products of history. Seers, priests, warriors
and shepherds have abounded in all times and places.
But this fauna of experimental man apparently
requires for its production a combination of
circumstances more exceptional than those that
engender the unicorn. Such a bare, sober fact should
make us reflect on the supervolatile, evaporative
character of scientific inspiration [51].
Whatever ‘must remain active in men’s souls’, to a
great extent it must come from educators who recognize
that it is not their duty to make children happy; rather, it
is their duty to transform children into adults.
Conclusions
Transforming children into adults - this has been the
theme of this essay and it is also the theme of Arendt’s
The Crisis in Education, in which she notes, ‘Childhood
is a temporary stage, a preparation for adulthood’. This
essay is not about lack of innate intelligence or a lack of
desire to accomplish great things. A student may enter
the academy with both a brilliant mind and a longing to
join the community that has driven the great scientific
enterprise, but if the academy shirks its responsibility
and impoverishes that student, then that brilliant and
ambitious mind will not come close to achieving its true
potential. The manner in which human beings scientific-
ally perceive the world has gone through at least four
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by certain names: (1) Plato and Aristotle, (2) Galileo
and Newton, (3) Hume and Kant, and (4) Einstein and
Heisenberg. Here we are not talking about radical theor-
ies, but rather radical transformations of mind. In that
sense, these are maturing transformations, in each case
the notion of intellectual adulthood being redefined. The
young student enters the academy as a wet-behind-the-
ears babe and must be transformed through these stages,
perhaps kicking and screaming, into an adult who appre-
ciates the road humans have traveled in two and half
millennia to achieve the current state of maturity. Only
then does the aspiring scientist appreciate the limitations
of science and the mathematical, logical, and experimen-
tal rigor necessary to achieve scientific truth.
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